What Calls to ARMs? International Evidence on Interest Rates and the Choice of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages by Badarinza, Cristian et al.
What Calls to ARMs? International
Evidence on Interest Rates and the
Choice of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Badarinza C, Campbell JY, Ramadorai T. 2015. What Calls to
ARMs? International Evidence on Interest Rates and the Choice
of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages. Working paper, Department of
Economics, Harvard University.
Published Version 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2629
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:24873716
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
What Calls to ARMs?
International Evidence on Interest Rates and the
Choice of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
Cristian Badarinza, John Y. Campbell, and Tarun Ramadoraiy
This version: June 2015
First draft: June 2013
Abstract
The relative popularity of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) and xed-rate mort-
gages (FRMs) varies considerably both across countries and over time. We ask how
movements in current and expected future interest rates a¤ect the share of ARMs
in total mortgage issuance. Using a nine-country panel and instrumental variables
methods, we present evidence that near-term (one-year) rational expectations of future
movements in ARM rates do a¤ect mortgage choice, particularly in more recent data
since 2001. However longer-term (three-year) rational forecasts of ARM rates have a
relatively weak e¤ect, and the current spread between FRM and ARM rates also mat-
ters, suggesting that households are concerned with current interest costs as well as
with lifetime cost minimization. These conclusions are robust to alternative (adaptive
and survey-based) models of household expectations.
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1 Introduction
The structure of housing nance is highly variable both across countries and over time. One
of the most important aspects of this structure from the perspective of macroeconomics is the
interest rate schedule applicable over the life of a mortgage loan. Mortgage rate provisions
can broadly be categorized into two groups. Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) entail a con-
stant nominal interest rate throughout the life of the mortgage. Adjustable-rate mortgages
(ARMs) have an interest rate that varies over the life of the contract in relation to mar-
ket conditions. The share of mortgages issued that are ARMs (the ARM share) exhibits
signicant cross-country and time-series variation. In the US, for example, the dominant
mortgage form is normally a 30 year xed rate mortgage, but ARMs were unusually popular
in the late 1980s, mid 1990s, and mid 2000s; whereas in the UK, it is di¢ cult to nd an
interest rate xation period that is much above 5 years.
These di¤erences in the structure of housing nance inuence the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler 1995), as movements in short-term market interest
rates directly a¤ect the budgets of all ARM borrowers, while FRM borrowers are only af-
fected by long-term interest rates, and then only if rates fall and these borrowers are able to
renance their mortgages (Taylor 1995, Miles 2004). In the period of declining interest rates
since the Great Recession, there is some evidence that monetary policy has had a stronger
stimulative e¤ect in areas of the US where ARMs are more commonly used (Di Maggio,
Kermani, and Ramcharan 2015, Keys, Piskorski, Seru, and Yao 2014). While this might
lead central banks to prefer a high ARM share, as suggested in a widely publicized speech by
Alan Greenspan (2004), the ARM share is an outcome of household choice albeit inuenced
by housing nance regulation.
Our goal in this paper is to understand the determinants of the cross- and within-country
variation in the ARM share, with an emphasis on householdsreactions to movements in inter-
est rates. Our analysis also sheds light on the extent to which households are forward-looking
when choosing the form of their mortgages. This question of householdsforward-looking
behaviour has been studied extensively in macroeconomics, often in relation to consumption-
smoothing (e.g. Souleles 1999, Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles 2007, and Parker 2014).
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Theory and prior empirical work o¤er some guidance about the likely determinants of
household mortgage choice between ARMs and FRMs. Absent borrowing constraints, the
rational decision between xed- and variable-rate mortgages depends on the expected future
costs borne by the borrower over the life of the loan, in relation to the risks that these
costs will be higher or lower than expected. If the relative risks of ARMs and FRMs are
relatively stable, the primary determinant of variation in the ARM share over time should
be the spread between the current xed rate and the expectation of the average adjustable
rate over the life of the mortgage.
Koijen, Van Hemert, and Van Nieuwerburgh (KHN 2009) argue that households estimate
the future path of adjustable rates, and posit that they do this using a simple rule of thumb
which is well approximated by a backward moving average of realized ARM rates. They nd
evidence using US data that appears consistent with this hypothesis. On the other hand,
Campbell and Cocco (2003, 2014) suggest that the spread between the FRM rate and the
current ARM rate may be the relevant variable for determining mortgage choice, given that
borrowing-constrained households care about current interest costs and are particularly likely
to choose ARMs in order to reduce those costs. Households may also focus on the current
rate spread if they are constrained in the size of house they can buy by bank limitations on
the maximum interest-payment-to-income ratio at the origination of the mortgage.1
It is di¢ cult to ascertain the relative importance of these two explanations using time-
series data from a single country, because interest rates are persistent and the available
time-series on the ARM share is relatively short. This problem may be exacerbated by
inertia among market participants. For example, it may take time for banks to shift their
marketing strategies gradually towards mortgage forms that they think will have greater
customer appeal in current market conditions. In turn, households may be slow to respond
to movements in rates if they tend to copy other households who have taken out mortgages
recently, or simply if their expectations adjust gradually over time.
1Consistent with this, empirical papers by Brueckner and Follain (1988), Coulibaly and Li (2009), and
Dhillon, Shilling, and Sirmans (1987) use household-level data on mortgage choice and include the current
interest spread as an explanatory variable. Johnson and Li (2011) use data from the US Consumer Expen-
diture Survey to argue that adjustable-rate mortgage borrowers appear particularly likely to be borrowing-
constrained.
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To surmount these obstacles, we compile panel data on the ARM share, average interest
rate xation periods, ARM and FRM rates, interbank rates, government bond yields, and
survey forecasts of interest rates from nine countries. This helps to alleviate the constraints
imposed by a single country study, and allows us to bring more statistical power to bear on the
problem. While there are numerous comparative studies of mortgage market structure across
countries (for example, Lea 2011, Lea and Sanders 2011, IMF 2011, Bardhan, Edelstein, and
Kroll 2012), we are unaware of any study that uses cross-country data to study time-variation
in average xation periods or the ARM share.
Using our nine-country panel, we estimate a series of models that evaluate the relative
importance of current cost minimization and longer-term cost minimization as determinants
of mortgage product choice. Each model allows both the spread of the FRM over the
current ARM rate, and the spread of the FRM rate over average expected future ARM rates
to inuence the current ARM share and xation period. The models di¤er in the way they
model household expectations of future ARM rates.
Our rst approach assumes that households have rational expectations. Using a panel
instrumental variables (IV) method, we instrument realized future ARM rates (over horizons
between one and three years, assuming stationary as well as I(1) interest rate processes)
with current and past mortgage rates and government bond yields. This setup allows us to
test both the hypothesis that expected future changes in ARM rates have no inuence on
current mortgage choice (as implied by current cost minimization) and the hypothesis that
the current spread correlates with the ARM share only to the extent that it predicts future
ARM rates (as implied by longer-term cost minimization).
In our full sample, our results suggest that current cost minimization is the proximate
driver of household mortgage choice, although we do nd evidence that households anticipate
movements in ARM rates within the rst year after mortgage origination. Within the last
decade, there is more evidence for the relevance of longer-term cost minimization. These
results are robust to the inclusion of time xed e¤ects.
Our second approach follows KHN (2009) and assumes that households have adaptive
expectations, forecasting average future ARM rates with a backwards moving average of
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ARM rates. While we conrm in the US data studied by KHN that a backwards moving
average of ARM rates helps to determine the ARM share, we nd that the US is an exception
in this regard relative to the other countries in the panel.
Our third approach uses one-year ahead survey forecasts of short-term nominal interest
rates. Short-term interest rates inuence ARM rates both directly (for tracker or index-
linked mortgages) and indirectly (through the cost structure of banks), so their future path
is a substantial determinant of the expected relative costs of FRM and ARM contracts over
the life of the mortgage. We use survey forecasts both as additional instruments in our
basic rational expectations model, and as additional explanatory variables that may directly
a¤ect household mortgage choice if householdsexpectations are irrational but well proxied
by survey forecasts.
We show that the survey forecast data do contain relevant information about near-term
movements in interest rates. In a model where households are assumed to look forward one
year, survey forecasts correlate with the ARM share only because they predict movements
in future ARM rates over the next year. In a longer-term (three-year) forecasting model,
however, the correlation between survey forecasts and the ARM share cannot be explained
by the predictive power of the survey forecasts for future ARM rates. Instead, they seem
to have a direct inuence on mortgage choice, as would be the case if households respond to
irrational expectations of longer-term ARM rates that are correlated with survey forecasts.
Our panel analysis is focused on uncovering the determinants of relatively short-term
variation in the ARM share. Of course, there are likely broader macroeconomic determinants
of preferred mortgage form across countries, which help to determine the country-average
ARM share. One potentially important determinant is ination volatility. If a xed-rate
mortgage cannot be prepaid without penalties, as in Germany or in the US in an environment
of falling house prices, then a FRM is risky to the extent that ination is volatile and
persistent. If it can be prepaid without penalties, as in the US in an environment of rising
house prices, then ination volatility increases the FRM rate that banks will want to charge.
While ination volatility also makes an ARM risky for a borrowing-constrained household,
because it makes the timing of required payments more volatile in real terms, it is likely that
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the net e¤ect is to shift demand away from FRMs and toward ARMs (Campbell and Cocco
2003, Campbell 2013). While this is not our primary focus, we do nd suggestive evidence
for the role of historical country-specic ination volatility in explaining the country-average
ARM share using 14 countries including the nine countries in our panel analysis.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the cross-country data that
we compile and employ in our study. Section 3 describes the econometric methodology that
we use to evaluate the roles of current cost minimization and longer-term cost minimization in
household mortgage choice. Section 4 estimates these models. Section 5 explores robustness
and presents cross-country evidence on the role of historical ination volatility in explaining
the cross-country average ARM share. Section 6 concludes. An online appendix, Badarinza,
Campbell, and Ramadorai (2014), provides additional details about our data sources and
econometric procedures, and additional empirical results.
2 Data
Our panel analysis covers nine countries: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. For the countries which are part of the
Eurozone, we obtain aggregate monthly data on volumes and interest rates on new mortgage
loans from the statistical repositories of respective national central banks. These data are
part of the harmonized system, introduced by the European Central Bank in 2003, which
reports and aggregates credit volumes from country-level mortgage nance institutions. For
Sweden, we use the Swedish statistical agencys Financial Market Statistics report, which
contains monthly series of volumes and interest rates on new housing credit agreements, and
goes back to 1996. For Australia, we use data released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics,
which covers the period from 1991 to the present. For Denmark, we use the historical time
series of nancial statistics reported by the Danmarks Nationalbank, which begins in 2003.
Our mortgage data for the US is from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey, collected since
1992 by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Towards the end of the sample, the share
of adjustable-rate mortgages becomes very low in the US market and we therefore impute
values for the corresponding interest rates, in order to insure representativeness and time
5
series comparability. We verify that our results are not driven by this imputation of rates,
and give further details of this procedure in the online appendix.
In order to insure comparability across countries, we classify any mortgage loan which
either pays a variable interest rate until it matures, or has an initial xation period of up to
and including one year as an ARM. This includes trackercontracts with interest rates which
are linked to underlying indices or benchmark interest rates. For the US, we calculate monthly
population-weighted averages of interest rate xation periods at the individual loan level,
using data from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey. For all other countries, we approximate
the time series of interest rate xation periods by using the market share of mortgages for
three di¤erent xation period categories: 1 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years and above 10 years. We
calculate the average xation periods as weighted averages of interval means, i.e., 1-year for
ARMs, and 3, 7 and 20 years for FRMs, respectively.2
As measures of the nominal short- and long-term costs of lending, we use the 3-month
interbank rate and the 5-year sovereign bond yield in all countries. We measure the ination
rate as the monthly year-on-year change of the consumer price index (CPI). The data source
for both interest rates and CPI statistics is Datastream.
The ARM share and ination data for countries which are not part of our panel analysis
(but are included in our pure cross-country analysis) are derived from national central banks
and Datastream. Additional details about all data employed in the paper are provided in the
online appendix. We also present broader institutional information about these mortgage
markets in a separate institutional appendix, Badarinza et al. (2014), also available online.
Finally, we obtain data on interest rate expectations from Consensus Economics, as re-
ported in their Consensus Forecasts Report. The Report is based on surveys of local
economists, primarily employed by large nancial institutions. These economists predict the
evolution of nominal 3-month interest rates over the 12-month period following the survey
date. We compute country-level monthly time series by cross-sectionally averaging forecasts
across the set of respondents in each country. The disaggregated data are not available for
Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and Greece. We therefore drop Denmark from any analysis which
2The data for Australia, Ireland and Sweden do not allow for the computation of these series.
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uses survey forecast data. For Belgium, Ireland, and Greece, we use data on survey forecasts
for the Eurozone.
2.1 Cross-sectional and time-series variation in the ARM share
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the ARM share the percentage share of adjustable-
rate mortgages in the total volume of new mortgage loans issued to households and, for
countries where the data are available, the average period of initial interest rate xation
in years. We divide our countries into two groups, using the following algorithm. If the
volatility (time-series standard deviation) of the ARM share exceeds ve percentage points,
and if the volatility of the average initial interest rate xation period is either unmeasured
or at least equal to 1 year, then we classify the country as one with signicant time-series
variation in mortgage choice.
The top panel of the table shows the nine countries that satisfy both of these conditions,
and which we include in our panel estimation: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the USA. The bottom panel of the table shows countries
that do not satisfy these conditions, in other words countries where there is a dominant
mortgage form with minimal time-variation: Finland, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the
UK. Most of these countries have mortgage systems dominated by ARMs, but the mortgage
system in Germany is dominated by FRMs. The UK and Spain are two countries where the
ARM share does vary through time, but in a fashion that is not economically meaningful
because mortgage loans in these countries have very low average xation periods (far less than
three years, on average) which hardly vary over time. In other words, xed-ratemortgages
in these countries have such short xation periods that they are barely distinguishable from
adjustable-ratemortgages.
Table 1 documents considerable time-series variation in the ARM share within the coun-
tries selected by our algorithm. The time-series standard deviation of the ARM share ranges
from roughly 80% of the mean ARM share in the US to roughly 6% of the mean in Australia.
Figure 1 plots the history of the ARM share in each of these nine countries, along with the
contemporaneous spread between FRM and ARM rates. The gure shows both temporary
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uctuations in the ARM share that are typically correlated with the FRM-ARM spread,
and some longer-term movements that vary across countries3. For example Sweden moves
towards a greater average ARM share over the sample period, whereas the US moves towards
a lower average ARM share.
2.2 Survey forecasts of interest rates
In Table 2, we assess the information contained in Consensus Economics survey forecasts
for future realizations of interest rates using the following regression specication, which we
estimate both country-by-country and in a panel with xed e¤ects:
Rfi;t+12  Rfi;t = i + i(Rf;Si;t;t+12  Rfi;t) + "i;t+12: (1)
Here, Rfi;t is the 3-month interest rate in country i in period t and R
f;S
i;t;t+12 is the 12-month
ahead average consensus survey forecast in country i in period t. The hypothesis that the
survey forecasts are primarily rational expectations of future interest rates in country i implies
that we should estimate an intercept i = 0 and a slope coe¢ cient i = 1. More generally,
if the survey forecasts contain relevant information about future interest rate changes but
are quite far from rational, then we should nd i > 0 even if i 6= 0 and i 6= 1.
Table 2 estimates equation (1) for each country separately, and then for the panel as a
whole. The rst column of Panel A of the table reports uniformly negative intercepts that
are statistically signicant in Sweden, the Netherlands and the Eurozone. In other words,
survey respondents tend to predict slightly higher changes in interest rates than the ones
that actually materialize one year later. The second column of Panel A reports uniformly
positive slope coe¢ cients that are signicantly di¤erent from zero in all countries except
Australia, and insignicantly di¤erent from one in all countries except the Eurozone.4 The
third column of Panel A shows that the rational expectations hypothesis that the intercept
3An increase in long-term borrowing costs after the crisis is especially pronounced in Ireland. Irish banks
experienced higher funding costs as of October 2008, which lead to a signicant increase in the spread between
FRMs and ARMs. A comprehensive discussion of developments in the Irish mortgage market around the
crisis period is given by Goggin et al. (2012).
4The data sample for short-term interest rate forecasts at the level of the Eurozone only covers the period
after 2005, as indicated in Table 1. In this case, the rapid decline of interest rates during the nancial crisis
leads us to observe a slope coe¢ cient higher than one.
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and slope coe¢ cients equal zero and one, respectively, can be rejected at the 5% level or
better for all countries except the US and Italy.
Panel B of Table 2 imposes a common slope across countries but allows country-specic
xed e¤ects, and shows that the estimated slope is 1.02, insignicantly di¤erent from one.
For the purposes of our analysis, the slight upwards bias in the forecasts observed in Panel A
appears not to be particularly important, only a¤ecting the estimated regression constants
and country xed e¤ects. We conclude that the survey-based one-year ahead expectations
contain relevant information about the path of future interest rates. As we will see later,
the residual component of survey forecasts (that which is uncorrelated with the rational
expectation of interest rate movements) is correlated with movements in the ARM share.
This suggests that survey forecasts may also contain a component that is correlated with
householdsirrational expectations of longer-term ARM rates.
3 Methodology
In this section we present the methodology that we use to discover whether the positive
correlation between the ARM share and the spread between FRM and ARM rates, illustrated
in Figure 1, is driven by short-term cost minimization, or by rational forecasts of future ARM
rates.
We propose a simple model to distinguish between alternative explanations for variation
in the ARM share across countries i and months t:
ARMSHAREi;t = i + ARMSHAREi;t 1 + C(FRMi;t   ARMi;t)
+ L

FRMi;t   E^i;t[ARM i;t;t+T ]

+ i;t: (2)
In this equation, ARMSHAREi;t is the percent share of ARMs in total mortgage issuance
(i.e., total ARM issuance divided by the sum of total ARM issuance and total FRM issuance)
in each month, and ARMi;t and FRMi;t are country-specic monthly mortgage interest rates
on ARMs and FRMs respectively. ARM i;t;t+T is the forward-looking simple moving average
of the ARM rate in country i, evaluated between time t and time t+T , where T is measured
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in calendar years.5
In our panel estimation, we allow for country-specic intercept terms i, which control
for the possibility that there may be pure time-invariant cross-country variation in the ARM
share. We also include the lagged dependent variable ARMSHAREi;t 1, in order to capture
the e¤ect of inertia on the part of households or mortgage providers. As mentioned earlier,
it may take time for banks to shift their marketing strategies gradually towards mortgage
forms that they think will work better, or for households to respond to movements in interest
rates.
Interest rates are allowed to a¤ect mortgage choice in two ways. Current cost minimiza-
tion implies a positive contemporaneous relationship between the mortgage rate spread and
the share of ARMs, and this channel is captured by the coe¢ cient C . On the other hand,
if households rationally forecast variation in ARM rates over the longer-term to evaluate the
trade-o¤between ARMs and FRMs, the relevant variable is the spread between current FRM
rates and expectations about average ARM rates over the horizon T . We therefore interpret
a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient L as evidence for rational long-term cost
minimization by households.
This setup requires us to estimate household expectations of future average ARM rates,
E^i;t[ARM i;t;t+T ]. We consider three alternative models for household expectations rational
expectations, adaptive expectations, and survey proxies for expectations each of which leads
to its own empirical specication.
3.1 Rational household expectations
If household expectations are rational, we can use a panel instrumental variables approach,
replacing expected future ARM rates in equation (2) with realized future ARM rates, and
then instrumenting these future rates with current and lagged interest rates. This approach
can be described as a two-stage procedure.
The rst-stage regression uses current and past mortgage rates, as well as nominal short-
5The horizon T at which future payment streams are evaluated should, in theory, correspond to the
average xation period for xed-rate mortgages in each country. However, as Table 1 shows, we have
relatively short sample periods so we do not extend T beyond 3 years as doing so would leave us with a
remaining sample which is too short for accurate estimation.
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term interest rates and government bond yields, to predict ARM i;t;t+T :
ARM i;t;t+T = i + 1ARMi;t + 2FRMi;t + 3ARM i;t K;t + 4B
5
i;t + 5R
f
i;t + "i;t: (3)
Employing the same notation as earlier, ARM i;t;t K is the backward-looking moving average
of the ARM rate in country i, evaluated between time t and time t   K, where K is once
again measured in calendar years. We also include the 3-month interest rate Rfi;t and the
5-year government bond yield B5i;t as explanatory variables. Their separate inclusion allows
for benchmark rates and the excess of the ARM or FRM rates over these benchmark rates
to forecast future ARM rates with di¤erent coe¢ cients.
A variant of this approach modies equation (3) to account for potential non-stationarity
in interest rates. We assume that in the case of such non-stationarity, all interest rates are
cointegrated, with a coe¢ cient of cointegration equal to 1 for any given pair of interest rates.
Campbell and Shiller (1987) show that such cointegration arises if there is a unit root in the
short-term interest rate and the expectations hypothesis holds; the same will be true in the
presence of time-varying risk premia, provided that risk premia follow a stationary process.
Under this set of assumptions, in order to forecast ARM i;t;t+T we estimate the following
equation in which both right- and left-hand-side variables are stationary:
ARM i;t;t+T   ARMi;t = 'i + 1(FRMi;t   ARMi;t) + 2(ARM i;t K;t   ARMi;t)
+3(B
5
i;t  Rfi;t) + i;t: (4)
In the second stage, E^i;t[ARM i;t;t+T ] is the tted value from estimation of (3) or (4),
which is then substituted back into equation (2).
Our identication strategy is straightforward. If the current spread between FRM and
ARM rates (FRMi;t   ARMi;t) is useful at predicting ARMSHAREi;t only to the extent
that the spread forecasts ARM i;t;t+T , this will knock out any role for C in equation
(2) given our instrumental variables approach. However if current cost minimization drives
the ARM share, then C will continue to be important. The relative signicance of the two
coe¢ cients C and L in equation (2) allows us to measure the relative importance of current
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and longer-term cost minimization in household mortgage choice.
A few notes on our estimation procedure and results: First, we set T = 3 years and
K = 1 year in the benchmark case in our estimation. We also consider values of T = 1; 2
and K = 2; 3 years, and show results in the paper for T = 1, in the interest of preserving
clarity of exposition. The results for K = 2; 3 and T = 2 years are available in the online
appendix.
Second, estimation of equation (3) requires measuring a backward moving average of
ARM rates. Since our sample periods are quite short for many countries, we wish to avoid
shortening them further for models with a high K. For this reason, when K > 1, we
impute (back-cast) ARM rates prior to the beginning of our sample using nominal short-
term interest rates, which are available earlier than ARM rates, and provide details of this
procedure in the online appendix. This allows us to present all results for a common sample
period. Our results are very similar if we shorten the sample as K increases rather than
using this imputation approach.
Third, we calculate standard errors for all coe¢ cients using a non-parametric bootstrap
procedure, along the lines of Politis and Romano (1994), and as employed by Ramadorai
(2012). Details are provided in the online appendix.
3.2 Adaptive household expectations
An alternative approach follows KHN (2009) in assuming that household expectations follow
a simple adaptive process, E^i;t[ARM i;t;t+T ] = ARM i;t K;t, which we simply substitute back
into equation (2). In this case we use OLS to estimate the following specication:
ARMSHAREi;t = i + ARMSHAREi;t 1 + C(FRMi;t   ARMi;t)
+ L
 
FRMi;t   ARM i;t K;t

+ i;t: (5)
Current cost minimization implies that C > 0 and L = 0, while KHNs adaptive forward-
looking cost minimization implies that C = 0 and L > 0.
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3.3 Survey proxies for household expectations
Finally, we consider survey-based data on actual interest rate forecasts. These direct mea-
sures of agentsexpectations are well suited to serve as instruments for expected future ARM
rates, as they are forward-looking in nature, and potentially reect more relevant information
than current realizations of term structure variables. We also allow for the possibility that
the survey-based interest rate forecasts inuence mortgage choice directly a possibility if
household expectations are not fully rational, but are correlated with survey forecasts.
We alter our rst-stage regressions to include survey forecasts Rf;Si;t;t+12:
ARM i;t;t+T = i + 1ARMi;t + 2FRMi;t + 3ARM i;t K;t + 4B
5
i;t
+5R
f
i;t + 6R
f;S
i;t;t+12 + "i;t; (6)
and:
ARM i;t;t+T   ARMi;t = 'i + 1(FRMi;t   ARMi;t) + 2(ARM i;t K;t   ARMi;t)
+3(B
5
i;t  Rfi;t) + 4(Rf;Si;t;t+12  Rfi;t) + i;t: (7)
Similarly, we alter our main regression to include the survey forecast of the future change
in the short-term interest rate:
ARMSHAREi;t = i + ARMSHAREi;t 1 + C(FRMi;t   ARMi;t)
+L(FRMi;t   ARM i;t;t+T ) + S(Rfi;t  Rf;Si;t;t+12) + i;t; (8)
To the extent that households have rational expectations of future interest rates, the sur-
vey forecasts should only be useful instruments in the rst-stage regressions and should have
no additional explanatory power for the ARM share when included directly in equation (8).
That is, we should nd S = 0. We test this exclusion restriction in both the stationary and
the unit-root panel models. Alternatively, a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient
S implies that a survey forecast of increasing short-term interest rates over the course of the
next year leads to a decrease in the ARM share, beyond any information that the one-year
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forecasts may contain about the levels of future ARM rates.
4 Estimation of mortgage choice models
4.1 Rational expectations
Table 3 asks whether the ARM share is driven by the current FRM-ARM spread or by
the spread of the FRM rate over rational expectations of an average of future ARM rates.
We estimate equation (2) by instrumental variables, where equation (3) is our rst-stage
regression, assuming that interest rates are stationary.6
The table is divided into two sets of rows, each corresponding to a di¤erent sample:
the full sample, and a more recent sample beginning in 2001. We also di¤erentiate across
two sets of columns, between panel regressions that do and do not include the US. The
exclusion of the US is intended to provide an out-of-sample evaluation of the model
several studies including Brueckner and Follain (1988), KHN (2009), and Moench et al.
(2010) have attempted to explain the ARM share in the US, but to our knowledge, ours is
the rst academic study attempting to explain such variation in the additional 8 countries
in our panel.
In our benchmark presentation of the results, we set T = 3 years, and show estimated
coe¢ cients C and L. As described earlier, C measures the impact of the current spread
between FRM and ARM rates on the ARM share, while L measures the role of longer-term
forecasts, i.e., the impact of the spread between the current FRM rate and the average of
expected future ARM rates, on the ARM share.
Across all specications, we obtain a large coe¢ cient C that is always signicant at the
1% level. Moreover, we nd almost no evidence for longer-term forward-looking behavior
in the full sample: the coe¢ cient L is small and statistically insignicant. If we shorten the
sample to start in 2001, we do estimate L to be statistically signicant, but its magnitude
is still roughly half the magnitude of C . In the online appendix, we show that our results
6In the online appendix, we also report panel estimation results assuming that interest rates have a
common unique unit root. In this case, we estimate equation (2) by instrumental variables, where equation
(4) is our rst-stage regression.
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are una¤ected by the choice of K, the backward window for averaging ARM rates.
Next, we consider the case T = 1 in the last two columns of Table 3. That is, we compare
a FRM-ARM spread that includes the current ARM rate with a near-term alternative that
includes an average expected ARM rate over the next year. In contrast with the benchmark
T = 3 case, when T = 1, we typically obtain a small and statistically insignicant coe¢ cient
C and a larger coe¢ cient L which is signicant at the 1% level. This provides evidence
for near-term forward-looking behavior on the part of households, especially in recent data.
This contrast suggests that households may experience greater di¢ culty making accurate
longer-term forecasts, which are more relevant for lifetime mortgage cost comparisons.
The results assuming a unit-root interest rate process, which we report in the online ap-
pendix, are broadly consistent with those discussed above. In the benchmark case T = 3, the
coe¢ cient C on the current spread remains strongly statistically signicant for the post-2001
sample, while the coe¢ cient L on the forward-looking spread is variable both in magnitude
and statistical signicance. The coe¢ cients are less stable in the case T = 1, probably
reecting the fact that fewer instruments are available in the rst-stage regression for the
unit-root case, so the tted forward-looking FRM-ARM spread is more highly correlated
with the current FRM-ARM spread in the second stage.
In summary, there is some evidence that household mortgage choice responds to rational
forecasts of future ARM rates. This evidence is stronger for near-term forecasts of rates
within the next year than for longer-term three-year forecasts, and stronger in recent data
since 2001. However there is also evidence that the current FRM-ARM spread inuences
mortgage choice, and in most of our specications the current spread has a greater inuence
than the anticipated future spread.
Table 4 estimates country-specic regressions and provides more details about the un-
derlying coe¢ cients from equations (2) and (3) when K = 1 year and T = 3 years. The
rst-stage regressions generate relatively consistent results across countries 1 is positive
on average, which indicates that mortgage rates are persistent over the short-run. However,
3 is negative, which suggests that controlling for short-run continuation, there is a ten-
dency for ARM rates to reverse over the longer run. In the online appendix , we repeat this
15
exercise under the assumption of a unit root in interest rates. We generally nd evidence
that long-short spreads, both of FRM rates over ARM rates and of longer-term government
bond yields over short-term rates, tend to predict increases in ARM rates, and there is some
evidence of mean-reversion in changes in ARM rates.
Our analysis also reveals that in the second stage regression, i.e., equation (2), the coef-
cient on the lagged ARM share is high and statistically signicant. This is consistent with
a high degree of inertia in mortgage markets in every country in our sample. This inertia
could arise from sluggishness in the sales e¤ort of mortgage providers, in the sense that they
only gradually shift towards selling products that households are interested in buying. It
could also capture householdssluggish adjustment to interest rate movements, or spillovers
within the household sector with householdsmortgage decisions strongly inuenced by
other householdsrecent choices.
4.2 Adaptive expectations
In Table 5, we drop the assumption of rational forecasting and instead estimate rule-of-thumb
models as suggested by KHN (2009).
The left-hand side of the table estimates equation (2) under the assumption of simple
rule of thumb adaptive expectations. This specication results in positive coe¢ cients C
on the spread of the FRM rate over the contemporaneous ARM rate for all countries, and
for the panel as a whole. Current cost minimization seems therefore to be a consistent
feature of mortgage markets around the world, robustly estimated across our set of di¤erent
assumptions about the expectations formation process.
In contrast, the coe¢ cient on the term capturing the rule-of-thumb behaviour is estimated
to be negative and statistically signicant in most countries, suggesting that the backward-
looking nature of mortgage product choice at household level is a phenomenon restricted to
US households. Moreover, the results indicate that even in the US, the importance of past
ARM rates has decreased over time, with no statistically signicant e¤ects visible for the
more recent post-2001 sub-period.
The right-hand side of the table shows what happens when we exclude the lagged de-
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pendent variable in these regressions. First, our previous ndings in favour of current-cost
minimization remain robust and remarkably consistent across countries. Second, we conrm
the strong evidence reported by KHN (2009) in favour of backward-looking behaviour in the
US mortgage market: over the full sample, we nd that US ARM shares rise by 9 percentage
points in response to a one percentage point increase in the spread of FRM rates over a
one-year moving average of ARM rates7. However, we again nd that the strength of this
relationship is lower over the past decade, and reverses when we consider the cross-country
panel as a whole.
4.3 Survey expectations
In Table 6, we add survey forecasts of near-term interest rate movements to our analysis.
This table repeats the rational-expectations analysis of Table 3, but includes the forecasted
one-year change of the nominal 3-month interest rate both as an additional explanatory
variable, with coe¢ cient S, and as an additional instrument for future average ARM rates.
Once again the results are sensitive to the forecasting horizon that we consider. In the
benchmark case, the current FRM-ARM spread is always signicant and the survey forecast
of interest rate changes enters the regression directly in three out of four specications, while
the rationally anticipated future spread is never statistically signicant. The current spread
and the survey forecasts appear to drive out the rational forecast of future ARM rates in
determining household mortgage choice. Thus, while households may be forward-looking in
the sense that they are responsive to survey expectations of future interest-rate movements,
this forward-looking behavior is not consistent with fully rational cost minimization over
horizons longer than one year.
Given the evidence shown earlier in Table 2 that survey forecasts are rational predictors of
short-term interest rates over the next year, conditional on the information they contain, this
nding suggests that households use some but not all the information available for predicting
future ARM rates over the next three years. The other instruments have independent fore-
casting power that is not incorporated in survey forecasts or reected in household mortgage
7The choice of K does not a¤ect the estimated e¤ects qualitatively. In the online appendix, we also
report estimation results for the backward-looking horizon of K = 3 years, originally considered by KHN.
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choice. Consistent with this, we show in the online appendix that the other instruments
are jointly signicant in a panel regression of one-year changes in short rates onto survey
forecasts and instruments.8
The results for the case T = 1 strengthen the evidence that over a short one-year horizon,
rational interest-rate forecasts do a¤ect mortgage choice. The current FRM-ARM spread is
never signicant, while the rationally anticipated future spread is signicant in three out of
four specications. It is also the case in these specications that the survey forecasts enter
directly when we exclude US data.
5 Robustness and further analysis
5.1 Interest rate xation periods
In most European countries and di¤erently from the US, xed-rate mortgages are o¤ered for
a variety of initial xation periods. As mentioned above, FRM contracts entail very di¤erent
repayment streams in Spain and Germany, with short-term xation (below 5 years) more
common in the former and long-term xation (above 10 years) typical for the latter.
It is also interesting to note that in the nine countries constituting our estimation sample
(where the overall share of adjustable- vs. xed-rate mortgages varies through time), we
observe substantial time-variation in the market share of mortgages corresponding to di¤erent
initial xation periods.9
For example, in the Netherlands, households increasingly opted for long-term FRMs
during the years preceding the nancial crisis. More recently however, long-term FRMs have
virtually disappeared from the Dutch market, whereas the transaction volumes of FRMs
with lower xation periods have remained broadly unchanged throughout the decade. In
contrast, the increase in FRM volumes in Greece between 2006 and 2008 is associated with
an increased preference for relatively shorter-duration FRMs.
8We also note that condence intervals are quite wide in Table 2, so it is possible that survey forecasts
contain some noise that inuences mortgage choice but does not predict future movements in interest rates.
9In the appendix, we illustrate the dynamics of the monthly transaction volumes for residential xed-rate
mortgage contracts with di¤erent initial xation periods, grouped in three sub-categories: 1 to 5 years, 5 to
10 years and above 10 years.
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As a robustness exercise, we repeat our instrumental-variables panel analysis, replacing
the ARM share with the average xation period.10 Our set of countries is substantially
reduced, since disaggregated data on mortgage transaction volumes are only available for
the United States, Denmark, and countries in the Eurozone (see Table 1). Nevertheless, in
Table 7 we show that our results carry through in this setup. In particular, we continue
to nd evidence that households exhibit short-term forward looking behaviour, as well as
evidence that time-variation in the current FRM-ARM spread explains a signicant portion
of the dynamics of average xation periods.
5.2 Cross-country identication: time xed e¤ects
Our panel estimation approach relies on cross-country di¤erences in ARM share dynamics as
a way to distinguish between alternative theories. Of course, the power of this identication
method depends on whether mortgage interest rates and yield curve data exhibit su¢ cient
cross-sectional heterogeneity.
For instance, Figure 1 shows that the nancial crisis a¤ected the terms of mortgage loans
in a broadly similar fashion across countries: the FRM-ARM spread declines at rst, picks
up during 2009, and then declines again. The ARM share mirrors these dynamics, with
xed-rate mortgages being relatively more desirable before the onset of the crisis and the
share of adjustable-rate mortgages picking up thereafter.
We control for the possibility that common shocks may be responsible for driving the co-
movement between mortgage product choice and term structure variables, by including time
xed e¤ects in our benchmark specications. The results, reported in the online appendix,
conrm the dominant role of the contemporaneous spread. In the full sample of countries,
the estimated coe¢ cients C are barely a¤ected by the inclusion of the time xed e¤ects
and remain statistically signicant at a 1% condence level. Interestingly, the role of the
forward-looking component also remains robust in terms of estimated magnitudes, especially
for the post-2001 period, despite this coe¢ cient being less precisely estimated.
10In this context, it is no longer appropriate to compute the FRM-ARM spread as a weighted average
of rates across xation periods, as this would, by construction, introduce a simultaneity bias. We therefore
construct our right-hand side explanatory variables in this robustness exercise using the interest rates on
contracts with xation periods above 10 years.
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5.3 Cross-sectional patterns
Having explored the determinants of pure time-series variation in the shares of ARMs, we
conclude with a simple cross-country analysis of the determinants of the time-series average
ARM shares.
In the top two panels of Figure 2, we plot the country-level average ARM shares and
interest rate xation periods against the average FRM-ARM rate spread over the sample.
The very strong relationship between interest rate spreads and ARM shares which we doc-
umented in the time series dimension seems not to hold when we analyze the cross section
of countries. If anything, higher spreads tend to be weakly associated with a lower share of
ARMs.
We do not nd this surprising, though, given that the institutional structures of the
di¤erent international mortgage markets are likely to be a¤ected by numerous legal and
regulatory factors, foreclosure and bankruptcy rules, di¤erent prepayment penalty regimes,
as well as supply-side constraints referring to the cost structure of banks. We review these
factors in detail in a separate institutional appendix,11 and highlight the challenges involved
in generating comparable mortgage market statistics across countries.
Following Campbell (2013), the bottom part of Figure 2 plots the average ARM share
and average interest rate xation period versus the historical level of ination volatility in
each country. The gure shows that there is a strong positive cross-sectional relationship
between the average ARM share and the historical level of ination volatility, and a negative
relationship between the average xation period and historical ination volatility. This sug-
gests that there is a signicant role for household perceptions of ination risk in determining
household mortgage choice in the long run, consistent with the ndings of Malmendier and
Nagel (2014). Viewed through this lens, the striking cross-country di¤erences in the structure
of mortgage markets seems plausible: in most of Northern and Western Europe and the US,
ination has been contained over the last few decades, and xed-rate mortgages are more
prevalent. In contrast, in Southern Europe and Australia ination has been more volatile,
and higher ARM shares and lower xation periods are more prevalent.
11The web version of the institutional appendix is available through the following URL:
http://hhf.oxford-man.ox.ac.uk/node/804.
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6 Conclusion
Mortgage markets are remarkably heterogeneous across countries, and also vary considerably
over time. In a number of countries, including the US, the market share of adjustable-rate
mortgages (the ARM share) co-moves with interest rates. In this paper we ask whether
households choose the form of their mortgages in response to current interest rates, or also
in anticipation of future interest rates.
We uncover some evidence that households are forward-looking over relatively short pe-
riods of time. The spread between the xed-rate mortgage (FRM) rate and the average
rationally expected ARM rate over the next year is often a better predictor of the ARM
share than is the spread between the FRM rate and the current ARM rate. The evidence
for forward-looking behavior is particularly strong in more recent data since 2001.
Over a longer three-year horizon, however, the current FRM-ARM rate spread tends to
have a larger inuence on the ARM share than the spread involving rationally expected
future rates. Thus households do not seem to anticipate longer-term rate movements in the
manner that would be required to minimize the lifetime costs of their mortgages. Instead
the current rate spread is an important inuence on mortgage choice, as would be implied
by a model in which borrowing-constrained households seek low rates in order to maintain
the level of current consumption, or to increase the size of the house they can buy when
constrained by bank limitations on mortgage interest-to-income ratios.
We nd that a model in which households use an adaptive rule of thumb for forecasting
future ARM rates performs poorly in our international dataset, contrary to the US ndings
of KHN (2009). This does not imply that households are fully informed about the process
driving interest rates, or manage their mortgages optimally. On the contrary, there is evidence
that ARM borrowers in the US do not understand the extent to which ARM rates can vary
(Bucks and Pence 2008), and evidence for suboptimal mortgage renancing in Denmark,
the US, and the UK (Andersen et al. 2015, Campbell 2006, Miles 2004). We interpret this
nding as suggesting that mechanical forecasting rules may not be an adequate description
of household expectations about future interest rates.
We also bring survey data on interest rate forecasts into our analysis and nd that the
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ARM share tends to increase when professional forecasters expect short-term interest rates to
decrease during the next year. However the current FRM-ARM spread remains statistically
signicant even in the presence of this e¤ect, and we continue to reject the hypothesis of
rational longer-term rate forecasting even when using survey forecasts as an instrument.
Our analysis of time-series variation in the ARM share concentrates on interest rate
movements, but it is equally interesting to ask what drives persistent cross-country variation
in this share. We have presented evidence that historical volatility in ination is associated
with a high ARM share. This makes sense since ination volatility makes long-term nominal
contracts risky for both borrowers and lenders, or risky for lenders and correspondingly
expensive for borrowers in the case where FRMs can be renanced with minimal prepayment
penalties. There are of course many other variables that should help to determine mortgage
choice, including, for example, the cost of default and the prevalence of borrowing constraints,
and some of these may vary both over time and across countries. These questions remain to
be explored in future research.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
In Panel A, the table reports summary statistics on the share of adjustable-rate mortgages in percent of the
total volume of new loans to households, and the average period of initial interest rate xation (in years).
Under the heading S.d., we report time series volatility, measured by the realized standard deviation. The top
panel contains the countries which we include in our main panel analysis, for which the time-series standard
deviation of the ARM share exceeds ve percentage points and the standard deviation of the average initial
interest rate xation period is either unmeasured or equal to at least one year. In Panel B, the table reports
selected moments of the time series of 3-month nominal interest rates, as well as corresponding one-year
ahead consensus forecasts. Disaggregated forecast data are not available for Denmark, Belgium, Greece and
Ireland. In our panel estimation, we use forecasts at the level of the Eurozone for the latter three of these
countries.
Panel A
Mortgage market data
Share of ARMs Interest rate xation period Sample
Mean S.d. Min Max Mean S.d. Min Max coverage
Australia 88.25 5.06 74.50 97.80 1991-2013
Belgium 23.15 17.02 5.34 61.86 11.78 3.70 4.13 16.31 2003-2013
Denmark 44.59 13.17 13.88 73.25 8.69 2.86 2.99 14.96 2003-2013
Greece 63.14 23.25 20.55 93.12 3.38 1.00 1.84 5.57 2003-2010
Ireland 81.55 9.14 52.91 94.17 2003-2013
Italy 70.66 16.82 28.94 88.56 5.78 3.22 2.34 13.68 2003-2013
Netherlands 24.30 7.43 11.27 47.26 6.37 1.95 4.07 11.49 2003-2013
Sweden 53.62 17.67 14.47 90.76 1996-2013
USA 8.46 7.14 0.01 38.16 22.76 3.20 12.17 28.26 1992-2013
Finland 96.11 2.53 89.59 99.32 2005-2013
Germany 15.88 2.20 12.14 25.25 9.08 0.68 7.32 10.33 2003-2013
Portugal 97.16 2.98 85.91 99.51 2003-2013
Spain 85.32 7.81 64.62 94.16 1.54 0.23 1.20 2.07 2003-2013
UK 46.93 15.32 15.48 83.11 2.22 0.32 1.42 2.77 2004-2013
Panel B
Realizations and forecasts of 3-month nominal interest rates
Short-term interest rates Consensus forecasts Sample
Mean S.d. Min Max Mean S.d. Min Max coverage
Australia 5.69 1.86 2.58 15.81 6.05 1.94 2.56 15.10 1990-2013
Belgium 2.04 1.57 0.19 5.28 2.19 1.35 0.27 4.57 2005-2013
Italy 5.25 4.11 0.19 18.22 5.04 3.66 0.22 13.27 1990-2013
Netherlands 3.80 2.55 0.19 9.82 3.83 2.17 0.30 8.66 1990-2013
Sweden 5.02 3.76 0.48 20.00 5.01 3.08 0.88 14.25 1990-2013
USA 3.68 2.36 0.24 8.57 3.65 2.11 0.12 7.79 1990-2013
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Table 2
Rationality of one-year ahead interest rate forecasts
The table reports estimation results from regressions of the form:
Rfi;t+12  Rfi;t = i + i(Rf;Si;t;t+12  Rfi;t) + "i;t+12:
In this specication, Rfi;t is the 3-month interest rate in country i in period t and R
f;S
i;t;t+12 is the one-year
ahead average consensus forecast in country i in period t. Disaggregated forecast data are not available for
Denmark, Belgium, Greece and Ireland. In our panel estimation, we use forecasts at the level of the Eurozone
for the latter three of these countries. In Panel A, we estimate the coe¢ cients unrestricted country-by-
country. In Panel B, we consider the Eurozone to be a single unit and restrict the slope coe¢ cients  to be
identical across i. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coe¢ cients. Statistical signicance
is indicated through at most three stars, referring to condence levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A
Country-by-country estimation
Intercept Slope p-Value p-Value
i i i = 1 i = 0 and i = 1
Australia -0.55 0.55 0.34 0.01
(0.34) (0.47)
Eurozone -0.60** 2.30*** 0.01 0.01
(0.27) (0.51)
Italy -0.25 1.36*** 0.14 0.24
(0.23) (0.24)
Netherlands -0.45** 0.98*** 0.96 0.05
(0.19) (0.31)
Sweden -0.50* 0.82*** 0.56 0.03
(0.28) (0.31)
USA -0.28 1.16*** 0.69 0.51
(0.25) (0.40)
Panel B
Panel estimation with xed e¤ects
Slope p-Value
  = 1
Panel 1.02*** 0.92
(0.20)
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Table 3
Determinants of the ARM share in a cross-country panel:
Current mortgage rates vs. rational expectations of future rates
The table reports estimation results from panel instrumental-variables regressions of the form:
ARMSHAREi;t = i + ARMSHAREi;t 1 + C(FRMi;t  ARMi;t) + L(FRMi;t  ARM i;t;t+T ) + i;t;
where i are country-specic xed e¤ects. ARMi;t, FRMi;t and ARM i;t K;t are used as instruments for
ARM i;t;t+T : In our benchmark case, T = 3 years:The rst-stage model specication is given by:
ARM i;t;t+T = i + 1ARMi;t + 2FRMi;t + 3ARM i;t K;t + 4B
5
i;t + 5R
f
i;t + "i;t:
We show the results for K = 1 year. All estimations cover the same sample as the one with T = 3 years. We
report bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signicance is indicated through at most three
stars, referring to condence levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Benchmark (T = 3 years) T = 1 year
Panel Panel Panel Panel
excl. USA excl. USA
Full sample
C 0.74*** 0.87*** -0.08 -0.11
(0.25) (0.30) (0.42) (0.41)
L 0.31 0.46* 1.23*** 1.53***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.41) (0.42)
Post-2001
C 0.83*** 1.05*** -0.37 -0.22
(0.31) (0.37) (0.46) (0.53)
L 0.71*** 0.74** 1.74*** 1.85***
(0.24) (0.30) (0.46) (0.50)
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Table 4
Determinants of the ARM share at the country level:
Current mortgage rates vs. rational expectations of future rates
The table reports estimation results from country-by-country and panel instrumental-variables regressions
where ARMi;t, FRMi;t and ARM i;t K;t are used as instruments for ARM i;t;t+T , with T = 3 years
and K = 1 year:
ARM i;t;t+T = i + i;1ARMi;t + i;2FRMi;t + i;3ARM i;t K;t + i;4B
5
i;t + i;5R
f
i;t + "i;t:
The second-stage model specication is given by:
ARMSHAREi;t = i + iARMSHAREi;t 1 + i;C(FRMi;t   ARMi;t)
+i;L(FRMi;t   ARM i;t;t+T ) + i;t:
Correlation coe¢ cients among regressors are reported under the column heading  . Statistical signicance
is reported through at most three stars, referring to condence levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, based
on bootstrap standard errors.
First-stage estimation
1 2 3  1;2  1;3
R2 obs.
Full sample
Australia 0.89*** 0.12 -0.19** 0.91 0.84 0.66 222
Belgium -0.77*** -0.37 -0.17 0.87 0.75 0.83 72
Denmark -0.27 -0.44 -0.97*** 0.95 0.77 0.61 83
Greece -0.05 0.03 -1.01*** -0.14 0.48 0.96 47
Ireland -0.55 -0.58** -0.42*** 0.94 0.75 0.77 84
Italy 1.06 -1.04*** -0.56** 0.83 0.80 0.61 84
Netherlands 0.81*** -1.57*** 0.05 0.71 0.79 0.76 84
Sweden -0.01 1.28*** -0.33*** 0.94 0.83 0.67 166
USA 0.33** -0.47* 0.29 0.74 0.84 0.70 216
Panel 0.34*** 0.25*** -0.28*** 0.91 0.93 0.85 1058
Panel (excl. USA) 0.62*** 0.19** -0.34*** 0.95 0.94 0.87 842
Post-2001
Australia -0.06 -0.07 -0.18* 0.82 0.58 0.17 120
Sweden 0.75* 0.07 -0.36*** 0.96 0.80 0.36 120
USA 0.64** -0.81 0.39 0.82 0.82 0.62 120
Panel 0.40* -0.15 -0.42*** 0.91 0.90 0.84 814
Panel (excl. USA) 0.31** -0.12 -0.43*** 0.93 0.90 0.87 694
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Table 4
Determinants of the ARM share at the country level:
Current mortgage rates vs. rational expectations of future rates
(continued)
Second-stage estimation
 C L  C ;cL R2 obs.
Full sample
Australia 0.90*** 0.41 -0.05 0.22 0.84 222
Belgium 0.84*** 3.47*** 2.43*** -0.11 0.97 72
Denmark 0.81*** -0.41 -0.06 -0.47 0.63 83
Greece 0.97*** 1.04 2.66 0.69 0.98 47
Ireland 0.88*** 0.75 0.39 0.11 0.74 84
Italy 0.96*** 2.02* 0.05 0.09 0.99 84
Netherlands 0.92*** 1.32** 0.49 0.22 0.93 84
Sweden 0.96*** 0.64 0.53 -0.56 0.93 166
USA 0.92*** 1.42** -1.13** 0.63 0.93 216
Panel 0.95*** 0.74*** 0.31 0.43 0.99 1058
Panel (excl. USA) 0.95*** 0.87*** 0.46* 0.29 0.98 842
Post-2001
Australia 0.99*** -0.04 0.70 0.22 0.92 120
Sweden 0.95*** -0.11 0.12 -0.67 0.89 120
USA 0.95*** 0.19 -0.58 0.36 0.94 120
Panel 0.95*** 0.83*** 0.71*** 0.28 0.99 814
Panel (excl. USA) 0.95*** 1.05*** 0.74** 0.27 0.98 694
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Table 5
Determinants of the ARM share at the country level:
Current mortgage rates vs. adaptive expectations of future rates
The table reports estimation results from the panel specication:
ARMSHAREi;t =i + iARMSHAREi;t 1 + i;C(FRMi;t  ARMi;t)
+ i;L(FRMi;t  ARM i;t K;t) + i;t;
which we estimate for each country separately, as well as in a pooled panel setup with country-specic xed
e¤ects. In the two rightmost columns we report estimation results when excluding the lagged dependent
variable, i.e. imposing the restriction i = 0. Statistical signicance is reported through at most three stars,
referring to condence levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively, based on bootstrap standard errors.
Benchmark (K = 1 year) Excluding lagged term
C L C L
Full sample
Australia 0.33 0.05 3.56*** -1.09***
Belgium 1.94** -3.46*** 21.15*** 0.67
Denmark 0.50 -1.62 5.51*** -6.58***
Greece 6.61* -4.83 34.35*** 8.52
Ireland 0.81 -2.62*** -0.01 -12.94***
Italy 2.59*** -2.83*** 8.58*** 15.87***
Netherlands 1.80*** -0.44 7.10*** 6.08***
Sweden 0.56 -0.95** 10.94** -1.24
USA 0.04 1.08** -1.75** 8.99***
Panel 1.17*** -0.53*** 10.23*** -1.01*
Panel excl. USA 1.27*** -0.61*** 11.68*** -1.72***
Post-2001
Australia 0.22 0.13 6.82*** -2.52***
Sweden 0.13 -1.37*** 17.04*** -3.76**
USA -0.24 0.26 -3.40*** 4.12
Panel 1.23*** -0.73*** 12.58*** -1.95***
Panel excl. USA 1.48*** -0.80*** 14.45*** -2.37***
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Table 6
Determinants of the ARM share in a cross-country panel:
Current mortgage rates vs. survey-based expectations of future rates
The table reports estimation results from panel regressions of the form:
ARMSHAREi;t = i + ARMSHAREi;t 1 + C(FRMi;t  ARMi;t) + L(FRMi;t  ARM i;t;t+T )
+ S(R
f
i;t  Rf;Si;t;t+12) + i;t;
where i are country-specic xed e¤ects and R
f;S
i;t;t+12 is the consensus forecast of the one-year ahead nominal
interest rate. The rst-stage model specication is given by:
ARM i;t;t+T = i + 1ARMi;t + 2FRMi;t + 3ARM i;t K;t + 4B
5
i;t + 5R
f
i;t + 6R
f;S
i;t;t+12 + "i;t:
We show the results for the case K = 1 year. We report bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Statistical
signicance is indicated through at most three stars, referring to condence levels of 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
Benchmark (T = 3 years) T = 1 year
Panel Panel Panel Panel
excl. USA excl. USA
Full sample
C 0.92*** 1.59*** -0.08 0.66
(0.28) (0.33) (0.45) (0.48)
L 0.18 0.22 1.26*** 1.07***
(0.25) (0.23) (0.43) (0.41)
S 0.48* 1.32*** 0.13 0.86**
(0.25) (0.36) (0.21) (0.34)
Post-2001
C 1.08** 2.11*** -0.18 1.23
(0.48) (0.48) (0.59) (0.96)
L 0.47 0.15 1.51*** 0.85
(0.29) (0.37) (0.49) (0.78)
S 0.49 1.76*** 0.06 1.21
(0.38) (0.59) (0.42) (0.76)
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Table 7
Determinants of the average xation period in a cross-country panel:
Current mortgage rates vs. rational expectations of future rates
The table reports estimation results from panel instrumental-variables regressions of the form:
AV GFIXi;t = i + AV GFIXi;t 1   C(FRMi;t  ARMi;t)  L(FRMi;t  ARM i;t;t+T ) + i;t;
with country-specic xed e¤ects. AV GFIXi;t is the average xation period and FRM

i;t is the rate on
mortgage loans corresponding to a xation period . For all countries, we choose  =above 10 years.
ARMi;t, FRM

i;t and ARM i;t K;t are used as instruments for ARM i;t;t+T . In our benchmark case, T = 3
years. The rst-stage model specication is given by:
ARM i;t;t+T = i + 1ARMi;t + 2FRM

i;t + 3ARM i;t K;t + 4B
5
t + 5R
f
t + "i;t:
We show the results for K = 1 year. All estimations cover the same sample as the one with T = 3 years.
Statistical signicance is reported through at most three stars, referring to condence levels of 10%, 5% and
1% respectively, based on bootstrap standard errors.
Benchmark (T = 3 years) T = 1 year
Panel Panel Panel Panel
excl. USA excl. USA
Full sample
C 0.18*** 0.22*** -0.10 -0.18
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
L 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.38*** 0.50***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Post-2001
C 0.13** 0.22*** -0.23** -0.18
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
L 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.46*** 0.50***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
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Figure 1
Time series of ARM share and FRM-ARM spread at the country level
The gure illustrates the dynamics of the share of adjustable-rate mortgages in percent of the total volume of
new loans to households (on the left axis) and the contemporaneous spread between the FRM and ARM rates
(on the right axis). For the US, imputed values are used for the ARM rate during the periods November 2008
to March 2009, August 2011 to November 2011 and October 2012 to April 2013. Details of the imputation
method are given in the online appendix . Mortgage interest rates correspond to volume-weighted averages
of new loans advanced during the respective month, in domestic currency and to domestic households.
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Figure 2
Cross-country patterns in mortgage market structure and historical ination volatility
Ination volatility is measured as the realized standard deviation of the monthly year-on-year ination rate
during the entire available sample period. For Australia, Belgium, Germany, Spain and the US, the series
starts in 1956, Italy in 1958, Greece in 1960, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden in 1961, Ireland
in 1970, Denmark in 1981 and the UK in 1989. Average xation periods are derived based on the market share
of mortgages falling within di¤erent xation period categories. The green dots are distinguishing countries
which are not included in the panel analysis. The FRM-ARM spread refers to the di¤erence between the
volume-weighted averages of interest rates on xed-rate (FRM) versus adjustable-rate (ARM) mortgage loans
advanced during the respective month.
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